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FIVE CRITICAL ISSUES IN NEW YORK’S GRANDPARENT
VISITATION LAW AFTER TROXEL V. GRANVILLE
STEPHEN A. NEWMAN*
Law guards us from all evils but itself.
—Henry Fielding
In 1936 the New York Court of Appeals showed wisdom and
humility in making this observation about courts and childrearing:
The vast majority of matters concerning the upbringing
of children must be left to the conscience, patience, and
self-restraint of father and mother.  No end of difficulties
would arise should judges try to tell parents how to bring
up their children.  Only when moral, mental, and physical
conditions are so bad as seriously to affect the health or
morals of children should the courts be called upon to
act.1
Family law has turned over many times since then, but the es-
sential truth the court grasped nearly seven decades ago still holds.
It is a truth that the current Court of Appeals needs to reaffirm as it
deals with an issue that inevitably will reach the Court soon: the
nature and scope of grandparent visitation rights.  The problems
with these rights were highlighted — but not deeply explored — by
the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Troxel
v. Granville.2  While the implications of Troxel are far from clear,
the case has prompted courts across the nation3 to reconsider their
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.  J.D. Columbia Law School.
1. People ex. rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285 (1936).
2. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
3. A number of state high courts have ruled their statutes unconstitutional per se
or as applied. See In re Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2003); Glidden v.
Conley, 820 A.2d 197 (Vt. 2003); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002); Camburn
v. Smith, 586 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 2003); Wickam v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002); Lulay v.
Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521 (Ill. 2000); State v. Paillet, 16 P.3d 962 (Kan. 2001); Linder v.
Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841 (Ark. 2002); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000); Neal
v. Nesvold, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla. 2000); DeRose v. DeRose, 666 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. 2003);
Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002).
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490 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
grandparent visitation laws, taking into account both constitutional
requirements and state public policy concerns.
In this essay, I will explore five distinct issues raised by litiga-
tion under the New York statute, Domestic Relations Law § 72.
These five questions require careful consideration, but were not
clearly answered by Troxel:
1. Should New York’s “standing” requirements in grandpar-
ent visitation cases be strengthened to provide, at the outset of a
case, protection for parents from the considerable burdens of
grandparent litigation?
2. Should courts adopt a “strict scrutiny” standard to judge
the constitutionality of grandparent visitation orders imposed upon
parents?
3. How substantial is the “special weight” that, under Troxel,
must be given to parental decisions on visitation?
4. What standard should the courts adopt for modifying or
terminating grandparent visitation orders?
5. Should law guardians routinely be appointed in grand-
parent visitation cases?
To answer these questions, I will first examine in detail the
many significant ways that grandparent visitation litigation burdens
the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions.
The heavy burdens on parents and children created by litigation
under the grandparent visitation statute in New York must be re-
duced in order to satisfy both Troxel’s constitutional mandate and
the state’s traditional interest in protecting families and children.  I
suggest that there are persuasive reasons to adopt an interpretation
of DRL § 72 that significantly defers to parental choices about visita-
tion, except in extraordinary cases where a child’s need for grand-
parent contact is compellingly clear.  In all other cases, judges
should defer to parental childrearing decisions, in order to avoid
coercive interventions that can do great harm to the family by in-
vading its privacy, damaging the parent-child relationship, weaken-
ing parental authority, generating great stress on the family unit,
and draining the family’s financial resources.
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I. THE NEW YORK STATUTE
Grandparent visitation rights, which did not exist at common
law, were created by the New York State legislature in 1966.  The
statute, section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law, permitted grand-
parents to sue for visitation rights when one or both of the
grandchild’s parents died; the court then had to determine if the
visitation was in the child’s best interest.
In 1975, the statute was expanded to allow grandparents to sue
even if a parent had not died, provided they could show that “eq-
uity would see fit to intervene.”  The statute, as amended, deter-
mined the standard for grandparent visitation in effect today, and
reads in pertinent part as follows:
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, re-
siding within this state, is or are deceased, or where cir-
cumstances show that conditions exist which equity would
see fit to intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents of
such child may apply to the supreme court * * * or may
apply to the family court * * * [and] the court, by order,
after due notice to the parent or any other person or
party having the care, custody, and control of such child
* * * may make such directions as the best interest of the
child may require, for visitation rights for such grandpar-
ent or grandparents in respect to such child.
In June, 2003, the legislature further amended DRL § 72 to
allow grandparents to seek custody of grandchildren when “ex-
traordinary circumstances” dictated the need to give custody of a
child to a grandparent.  This amendment did not change the ex-
isting visitation standard.  Rather it seems to have merely codified
longstanding case law in New York that allows any third parties (not
just grandparents) to seek custody in a court proceeding in limited,
extraordinary circumstances, such as parental surrender, abandon-
ment, abuse, or a prolonged period when the child is separated
from the parent and bonds to another caretaking adult.4
The adoption of a legal standard that strongly favors parents
showed that the legislature understood the need to give parents pri-
macy over non-parents in the custody context.  The legislature’s
4. See Bennett v. Jefferies, 40 N.Y.2d 543 (1976); Lucore v. Lucore, 721 N.Y.S.2d
207 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 58 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 58 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR305.txt unknown Seq: 4 16-APR-04 14:32
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failure to correct the absence of parental primacy in the visitation
portion of § 72 is puzzling, unless one assumes that in the waning
days of the 2003 legislative session, when this bill was passed, last
minute politics and interest group pressure by senior citizen groups
dictated that the visitation section’s problems be ignored.  Unfortu-
nately, bills passed at the end of the session in Albany are often
voted on in a rush that doesn’t allow legislators to carefully consider
(or sometimes even to read) what they are passing.5  The bill was
signed into law by the governor on October 7, 2003, to take effect
ninety days later.
The legislative history of the grandparent visitation statute is
sparse.  In Emanuel S. v. Joseph E.,6 the Court of Appeals deemed the
legislature’s purpose to be a “humanitarian” one, to preserve the
experience of grandparents as a “precious part” of the experience
of childhood.7  The court quoted the sponsor of the 1975 statutory
amendment to the effect that the there might be a “variety of po-
tential situations where the utilization of such a resource [i.e., visita-
tion] could be of invaluable consequence to the children and
ultimately the society.”8
This made it appear that the legislature had not considered
any limits to the situations it had in mind, but in fact examination
of the entire paragraph in which the sponsor’s comment appears
shows that some particular kinds of situations were the source of
the legislature’s concern.  Immediately prior to the sentence
quoted by the court, the sponsor had said: “Cases of child abuse
and child neglect are all too familiar.  This bill seeks to enable the
Court to intervene in certain situations to provide visitation rights
for grandparents in respect to their grandchild if the situation war-
rants it.”9  Another of the bill’s sponsors had noted that “in the con-
5. See Editorial, The Legislature’s Last Moments, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at A24.
See also ANDREW J. CHERLIN & FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR., THE NEW AMERICAN GRANDPAR-
ENT: A PLACE IN THE FAMILY, A LIFE APART 5 (Harvard U. Pr. 1992), stating: “State legisla-
tures who worked for grandparents’ rights undoubtedly were motivated by the
increasing proportion of older voters . . . . Voting against grandparents is political
suicide.”
6. 577 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
7. Id. at 28.
8. Id.
9. N.Y. STATE LEGIS. ANNUAL 1975 at 51, quoted in Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 560
N.Y.S. 2d 211, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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text of today’s society with a high divorce rate, many disinterested
parents do not concern themselves with the welfare of a child who
is in the custody of the other parent.”10  It was in these contexts, of
divorce or child mistreatment, that the sponsors thought a child
might need the state to override parental decision making to order
visitation that could provide the child with a source of emotional
support and even physical protection, when a parent’s care was be-
low minimum standards.
Over the years, the Court of Appeals decided only a handful of
cases under the statute.11  No case analyzed the difficulties that
grandparent litigation posed for parents and children.  No opinion
squarely confronted the serious constitutional questions raised by
the statute.12  In other family law cases, the Court of Appeals
strengthened parental rights,13 but it did not see any inconsistency
in applying a grandparent visitation statute that allowed parental
decisions to be superseded by a judge based only upon his own as-
sessment of the “best interests of the child.”14  Instead, the Court
tended to give vague statutory terms like “where equity would see fit
to intervene” an expansive reading.15  In sum, despite the statute’s
broad language, its invitation to encroach on parental due process
rights, and its reliance on the unpredictable “best interest of the
child” standard (which the Court itself has admitted “eludes ready
definition)”16, the statute found favor in the Court of Appeals.
10. Letter from New York State Senator Leon E. Giuffreda, to Counsel for the
Governor (June 19, 1975), quoted in Emanuel S., 560 N.Y.S. 2d at 213.
11. See People ex rel Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320 (1981); Lo Presti v. Lo
Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522 (1976); Layton v. Foster, 61 N.Y.2d 747 (1984); Emanuel S. v.
Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178 (1991).
12. The court did acknowledge the issue but declined to consider it in Emanuel S.
v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178 (1991).
13. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 656 (1991) (recognizing right of fit
parent “to choose with whom her child associates”; party acting as co-parent denied
visitation rights); Ronald FF v. Cindy GG, 70 N.Y.2d 141 (1987) (same); Matter of
Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 655 (1979) (giving “great deference” to parent accused of
medical neglect of child).
14. The Appellate Division, Third Department, in Ziarno v. Ziarno, 726 N.Y.S.2d
820 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) saw the problem, citing Ronald FF v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d
141, in support of its determination that a grandparent visitation order requires a com-
pelling state purpose.
15. Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d at 181.
16. In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 312 (1992).
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The state’s lower courts went about the job of applying the stat-
ute.  Some judges were untroubled by their broad authority to im-
pose visitation orders upon unwilling parents.  Others, however,
found judicial intervention in decision making by fit parents to be
ill-considered and unwise.17  Judge I. Leo Glasser, a New York Fam-
ily Court judge later appointed to the federal bench, wrote in one
of these cases:
If affection remains between members of the family there
would be no need to invoke D.R.L. sec. 72.  That statute
would be called into play only in a case such as this where
the relationship between grandparents and parents is a
hostile one. . . . I believe ties of nature would prove far
more effective in restoring kindly family relations than co-
ercive measures that must follow judicial intervention.  I
would suggest that the legislature give serious considera-
tion to the advisability of repealing D.R.L. sec. 72.18
II. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE
In June 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in a grandparent visitation case, Troxel v. Granville.19  The case
involved a petition brought by the Troxels, the grandparents, after
their son committed suicide.  Their grandchild’s mother, Tommie
Granville, had allowed visitation, but not enough for the grandpar-
ents, who decided to sue under a Washington state statute that per-
mitted any third party to seek visitation if it was in the best interest
of the child.  The trial judge, musing about his own childhood ex-
perience with his grandparents,20 ordered increased visitation.
Six justices agreed that Tommie Granville had been deprived
of her constitutional right to make childrearing choices for her two
daughters.  Of the six justices voting to affirm the judgment for the
mother, four (the plurality opinion authored by Justice O’Connor)
found a parent’s decision on visitation enjoys a presumption of cor-
17. A Queens County Family Court judge, Guy DePhillips, protested the law’s mis-
chief and likely unconstitutionality in Doe v. Smith, 595 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Fam. Ct. 1993)
and In re Farag, 2001 WL 1263324 (Fam. Ct. Queens County 2002).
18. Geri v. Fanto, 361 N.Y.S.2d 984, 989 (Fam. Ct. 1974).
19. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
20. Id. at 72.
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rectness and is entitled to “special weight;”21 one suggested ruling
unconstitutional per se the state of Washington’s broad visitation
statute permitting judges to supplant parents in deciding what is
best for children (Justice Souter);22 and one suggested giving the
highest level of “strict scrutiny” to infringements of the parent’s
constitutional childrearing right (Justice Thomas).23
The plurality opinion authored by Justice O’Connor has been
the touchstone for analysis of Troxel by state courts weighing the
constitutionality of their own grandparent statutes.  This is the cor-
rect approach, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Marks v.
United States.24  There, the Court observed that “when a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”25  This standard gives
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Troxel the force of
precedent.
That opinion identifies the “fundamental right” that belongs
to parents to “make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children” under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.26  This required the state of Washington
to protect the mother’s right to “make decisions concerning the
rearing of her own daughters.”27  Significantly, the opinion de-
clared that “there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best
interests of their children . . . .  Accordingly, so long as a parent
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit) there will nor-
mally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s
children.”28
21. Id. at 68.
22. Id. at 75-78.
23. Id. at 80.
24. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
25. Id. at 193 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
26. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
27. Id. at 68.
28. Id. at 58.
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The plurality found that the state court had failed to give the
parent’s decision any “special weight,” and failed to accord her the
constitutional presumption that her decision about visitation was in
her children’s best interest.  In fact, in the trial court it appeared
the judge gave the parental decision no weight, and indulged his
own personal belief that grandparent visitation was generally desira-
ble for all children.  In the view of Justice O’Connor, he merely
substituted his own judgment about the child’s best interests for
that of the mother, with little evidence to support his conclusion
that the mother’s decision was wrong.
The plurality adopted Justice Kennedy’s statement that the
burden of litigating a visitation proceeding can itself be “so disrup-
tive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of
a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the
child’s welfare becomes implicated.”29  The plurality recognized
that “the litigation costs incurred by Granville on her trip through
the Washington court system and to this Court are without doubt
already substantial” and refused to remand the case, which would
only have the effect of “forcing the parties into additional litigation
that would further burden Granville’s parental right.”30
It is apparent that the plurality wished to act with restraint in
Troxel.  The opinion expressly declined to set forth the full scope of
the due process right it recognized, and it permitted the states to
keep their broad statutes, as long as they adjusted their case-by-case
applications of the law so as to respect the parent’s fundamental
child rearing right.  In essence, the Court offered states the chance
to analyze the needs of parents and children, define the appropri-
ate interests of the state, and carefully explore the burdens that ju-
dicial intrusions into child rearing impose.
III. THE BURDENS OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION LITIGATION
After Troxel, the task of state courts is not simply the usual one
of complying with the Court’s dictates, but the more difficult one of
confronting the issues raised by state interference in family affairs
with more careful deliberation.  States like New York, with broad
statutes that speak vaguely of “equity” and “the best interest of the
29. Id. at 75 (quoting Kennedy, J., dissent at 80).
30. Id. at 75.
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child,” must now pay more serious attention to the need to justify
the use of governmental power in the constitutionally protected pri-
vate realm of family life.  As Justice O’Connor wrote in another sub-
stantive due process case, “. . . the purpose of heightened scrutiny is
not to prevent government from placing children in an institu-
tional setting, where necessary.  Rather, judicial review ensures that
government acts in this sensitive area with the requisite care.”31
To exercise “requisite care,” it is essential that the New York
courts thoroughly analyze the burdens on families and children
that grandparent visitation litigation inflicts.  This section will ex-
plore the nature and scope of these burdens, as a necessary prelude
to considering the five specific issues listed earlier.32
For discussion purposes, I will break down the burdens that
litigation imposes in these cases into seven categories:
• Invasions of family privacy
• Damage to parent-child communication
• Parenting “in the shadow of the law”
• Loss of family peace and tranquility
• Stress of lawsuits on children
• Financial burdens on the family
• The toll of judicial supervision, enforcement and relitiga-
tion on family life
A. Invasions of family privacy
Grandparent visitation litigation brings with it pronounced in-
trusions into a family’s privacy.  The legal process enmeshes the
family with a number of professionals whose job it is to probe into
the family’s life to assess parental decision making, parental mo-
tives, children’s feelings, and children’s relationships.
The parent’s own lawyer must be told everything about the
conflict between the parent and grandparent.  The lawyer ap-
pointed to represent the child33 will also seek detailed information
about the family.  Because the lawyer for the child has the power to
31. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 318 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
32. See supra text following note 3.
33. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 241, 249 (2003).  Reported cases show the discretion
to appoint a law guardian is routinely exercised in these cases.  For criticism of this
practice, see infra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
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make a critical recommendation to the judge, parents will feel com-
pelled to provide whatever personal information and access to
child, home and family the lawyer wants, in order to gain his sup-
port.  Parents must also submit to the probing of experts who evalu-
ate the family.  Because these experts, like the law guardian, make
important recommendations to the court, parents are compelled to
disclose whatever the experts wish to know, however intrusive or
personal their inquiries are.
Evidence, sometimes painful to recall and dwell upon, sur-
rounding the parental decision against visitation must be reported
to these attorneys, reduced to writing in affidavits for pre-trial mo-
tions (e.g., when grandparents seek visitation pendente lite), and ulti-
mately testified to in open court.  To counter the grandparent’s
case, parents sometimes must disclose the family conflict to other
relatives and friends as well, in order to enlist their aid and partici-
pation in the case.34
Disclosures to strangers about deeply felt problems with one’s
own parents or about painful memories from one’s childhood can
be embarrassing, disturbing, and emotionally distressing.  The
searching exploration into sensitive family problems permitted by
these lawsuits is facilitated by the “best interests of the child” stan-
dard employed in the New York statute.  This standard sets no dis-
cernible limit to the inquiry,35 presumably allowing examination
into any factor that might yield relevant data on, for example, a
mother’s parenting ability, her mental health, her interaction with
her child, her dealings with her own parents, even her own child-
hood unhappiness and disappointments.36
In one case, a grandfather sued both of his adult daughters for
visitation with their children.  Both women had to take the witness
stand to explain their estrangement from their father because of his
verbal abuse and callous behavior toward them and their mother
34. Matter of Gloria R., N.Y.L.J., Jan.11, 1994 at 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (court
hears testimony of child’s aunt, uncle, other grandparents, and suing grandmother’s
ex-husband).
35. The Court of Appeals has said the best interests test in custody cases requires
consideration of the “totality of the circumstances.” Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d
167, 174 (1982).  For a critique of the use of the best interests test in grandparent
visitation cases, see Stephen A. Newman, Overburdened Child’s Best-Interest Test, N.Y.L.J.,
May 28, 2003 at 2.
36. See, e.g., Wilde v. Wilde, 775 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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during their childhoods.  One of the women stated she would not
have any more children if her father were forced back into her
life.37  In another case, a father had to detail the humiliations he
suffered at the hands of his controlling father during childhood,
including lack of privacy in the bathroom.38  A third case included
a deeply disturbed adult woman who provided evidence that her
own mother, the petitioning grandmother in the case, was grossly
deficient as a parent.39
In a recent New Jersey case, a mother had to respond to in-laws
who attacked her as vindictive, irrational, and vicious, a liar and a
spendthrift who was implicated in her husband’s suicide because
she was greedy and forced her husband to work harder so she could
spend their money.40  The grandparents sued the mother less than
five months after her husband, a police officer, had shot himself at
home, in her presence.  The relentless legal attack ended nearly a
year and a half later, when an appellate court denied visitation and
scolded the grandparents for their indecent litigation behavior.
The intrusions of this litigation resemble the probing done in
traditional custody and visitation disputes.  For these cases, one
New York Family Court judge noted, “we are provided with forensic
psychological reports, family assessments, home studies, CASA re-
ports, DSS investigative reports, substance abuse reports, medical
records, school records, law guardian reports, and legal memo-
randa.  The Court is made privy to a family’s most private
behaviors.”41
B. Damage to parent-child communication
Parents are forced by grandparent visitation lawsuits to com-
municate with their own children in ways they might otherwise re-
gard as wholly inappropriate.  They must prepare their child for the
inquiries the child will face, and make their children available to
meet and talk about their family with strangers (e.g., a mental
37. See Doe v. Smith, 595 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Fam. Ct. 1993).
38. Matter of R and F., V.G. and K., N.Y.L.J., Dec.11, 1995 at 28 (Fam. Ct. N.Y.
County).
39. See supra note 34 at 22. For further discussion of this case, see Stephen A. New-
man, The Dark Side of Grandparent Visitation Rights, N.Y.L.J., June 14, 2000 at 2.
40. See Wilde, 775 A.2d 535.
41. Laura LL. v. Robert LL., 719 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Fam. Ct. 2000).
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health evaluator, a law guardian, and the judge).  In doing so, the
parents may feel impelled to justify their decisions to their children,
and to disclose matters about themselves and the grandparents that
they would not otherwise choose to reveal.  Parents lose the chance
to shield their children from knowledge of extended family strife
when such knowledge may be upsetting or inappropriate for the
children to learn.
The role of the child in the lawsuit may lead parents to a kind
of parent-child role reversal, where parents try to persuade the
child to their side, and the child sits in judgment of the parents’
views.  The child with his own lawyer and his own opportunity to
speak privately with the judge becomes a power to be reckoned with
in this litigation.  Parents are put in the awkward, indeed unhealthy,
position of soliciting their child’s aid.  A parent in this awkward situ-
ation may feel it necessary to deal with his own child in a circum-
spect way, distorting and undermining the parent-child
relationship.
C. Parenting in the shadow of the law
The involvement of legal professionals brings with it not only
intrusions on privacy but losses of family autonomy as well.  This is
most apparent when a judge issues orders telling a parent to yield
to unwanted visitation.  But a sense of loss of control over one’s
family life occurs at many other points during litigation.  At the out-
set of a case, a lawyer for the grandparents may make a demand for
visitation, coupled with the threat of costly litigation, that itself dis-
turbs the parent’s sense of normal authority over her own child.42
The parent must go out and find a lawyer to deal with the crisis.
Her lawyer will advise the parent that a judge can indeed override
her wishes, based in substantial part upon the judge’s assessment of
the child’s best interest, a legal standard that is vague and
unpredictable.
The parent who cares about the outcome of the case will seek
the lawyer’s advice on matters otherwise normally decided by the
parent.  To win the lawsuit, the parent must behave as a client, lis-
tening to her lawyer’s advice about how to behave with respect to
the other key figures in the case, including her child and the child’s
42. For an example of such a lawyer’s letter, see Wilde, 775 A.2d 535.
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lawyer.  Parenting issues, including what to say to one’s child about
the grandparent, how to prepare the child before a grandparent
visit ordered pendente lite, and how much, if any, visitation to offer
the grandparent, become not just parenting decisions, but strategic
legal moves.  During the course of the entire litigation, parents are
compelled to make parenting decisions “in the shadow of the
law.”43
D. Loss of family peace and tranquility
Charles Breitel, a former Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, memorably called one disputed visitation case “a mass of
hopelessly conflicting unpleasant cross-accusations.”44  He was re-
ferring to a battle between parents, but the same can be said of
litigation waged between grandparents and parents.45  This litiga-
tion is stressful for all involved, and its demands can destroy the
family’s tranquility, alter family dynamics, and disturb the family en-
vironment for both children and their parents.
The high degree of anxiety and turmoil felt by parents sued by
grandparents stems from several aspects of this litigation.  First, for
the average citizen, lawsuits of any kind are, in the words of Benja-
min Cardozo, “catastrophic experiences.”46  From the point of view
of a parent-defendant in a visitation case, a lawsuit represents co-
erced involvement in an unfamiliar and bewildering process, re-
quiring great investments of time and money, loss of privacy, and a
tawdry mix of accusation, conflict, and confrontation.  The adver-
sary system, premised upon the clash of parties in open court, en-
courages the parties to fully articulate their conflict with each
43. This phrase is borrowed from Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bar-
gaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
44. Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 587 (1978).
45. For a discussion of this aspect of grandparent cases, see Stephen A. Newman,
The Dark Side of Grandparent Visitation Rights, N.Y.L.J., June 14, 2000 at 2 (“Behind the
benign language about equity lies some of the most meanly fought disputes in the en-
tire field of family law . . . . Litigants may find their lives and characters denounced,
their past failures revealed in the most caustic light, and their intimate relationships
subjected to ruthless and stinging scrutiny.”).
46. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1921).
Judge Learned Hand expressed a similar view: “As a litigant I should dread a lawsuit
beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.”  Learned Hand, Address De-
livered Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL
TOPICS 89, 105 (1926).
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other, with professional advocates shaping and sharpening the
dispute.
The litigation process is inherently stressful and arduous.  It
requires an intense focus, over a long period of time, at great cost,
on an intractable dispute.  For parents sued by grandparents, the
harsh features of the adversary system are magnified.  The stakes
are not merely economic, but highly emotional and personal: con-
trol over one’s own children.  In the litigation, parents face accusa-
tions not about their conduct in the world at large, but in their own
homes.  They are accused of not raising their children correctly and
not acting in their children’s best interest.  In depositions and at
trial, parents face hostile questioning about their personal lives by
the lawyer for the grandparents.  Attacks on a parent’s character are
permitted in the broad ranging inquiry allowed under the “best in-
terests of the child” test.47  The litigation can extend over years.48
A parent sued by his or her own parents must confront deep
seated psychological issues.  Anger, hurt, and disappointment built
up in childhood are inflamed, and issues of control between parent
and adult child come to the fore.  The “child” has ostensibly gained
adulthood and independence, yet is thrust into a legal battle seek-
ing to undo that independence.  The subtext in such cases is often
dominance and submission, with the grandparent seeking to reest-
ablish authority and control.49  For the parent, the lawsuit becomes
an attack upon his or her status as an adult.
Lawsuits brought against divorced parents, or against a parent
whose spouse has died, create special hardships.  Grandparent liti-
gation too often comes at a time of great emotional upheaval in the
family, when a divorce, or the death of a parent, creates a crisis for
the child.  Children at such time naturally depend upon the
strength and comfort of the caretaking parent.  That parent, too,
needs peace of mind, solace, and time to reorganize her life.  Con-
47. Wilde, 775 A.2d at 542.
48. See, e.g., Seymour v. Glen S., 596 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (over 3-1/
2 year span between petition, filed April 1989, and decision on appeal reversing visita-
tion order, in January 1993).
49. See for example, a grandfather’s effort to control his adult son in Matter of R
and F., V.G. and K., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1995 at 28 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County); a controlling
grandmother suing her son in Matter of Gloria R., N.Y.L.J., Jan.11, 1994 at 22 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County).
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sider the difficulty faced by a parent struggling with bereavement or
the emotional crisis of divorce, now having to confront an antago-
nistic grandparent bringing a lawsuit against her, demanding visita-
tion rights.  That parent, the principal emotional support for her
children, should not be forced to engage in hostile litigation over
her child rearing decisions, absent some clear and compelling cir-
cumstances that call into question those decisions.
Yet the New York statute grants automatic standing to a grand-
parent when the child has suffered the most traumatic of events,
the death of a parent.50  Ideally, a bereaved parent would turn to a
loving grandparent for help and support.  But this ideal comes into
being not by coercion, but by virtue of nurturing family relation-
ships.  The burden of grandparent litigation only makes life more
stressful for the custodial parent and her child at a time of elevated
vulnerability and stress.
E. Stress of visitation lawsuits on children
Because children are sensitive to their parent’s anxieties, ten-
sions in the parents’ lives are felt by them.  Psychologist Andre
Derdyn, noting that these lawsuits often come after a divorce or the
death of one parent, observes that the child is likely to see the law-
suit through his parent’s eyes:
A grandparent’s filing suit for visitation during times of
children’s great losses and changes occasioned by death,
divorce, or remarriage of parents or adoption by steppar-
ents can only be experienced as yet another stress or
threat by the child’s primary caretaker, and, therefore, by
the child.  At times when the child’s need for stability and
security and for being certain upon whom he can depend
are very high, such legal initiatives by grandparents are
likely only to add to the child’s already excessive emo-
tional turmoil, if for no more reason than the initiation of
such litigation being seen as a threat to the integrity and
economy of the family by the parent or parents.51
50. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (2003).
51. Andre P. Derdeyn, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Rendering Family Dissension
More Pronounced?, 55 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 277, 285 (1985).  As one parent ob-
served, “my six year old child got very angry at this grandparents for doing this to his
mom.”  Telephone interview with Tracy Wilde (January 4, 2004).
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The link between parental well-being and the child’s welfare
has been affirmed by courts as well.  The Illinois Supreme Court in
Marriage of Collingbourne52 recently observed:
. . . the best interest of the child cannot easily be severed
from the interests of the custodial parent with whom the
child resides, and upon whose mental and physical well
being the child primarily depends.  Because the principal
burden and responsibility of child rearing falls upon the
custodial parent, there is a palpable nexus between the
custodial parent’s quality of life and the child’s quality of
life.
Parents who are distracted by the demands of litigation, and
distressed by it emotionally, may exhibit what psychologists Judith
Wallerstein and Joan Kelly, in their study of divorce, termed “dimin-
ished capacity to parent.”53  Children receive less attention from
the stressed parent, and less sensitivity to their needs.  If the grand-
parent lawsuit is initiated after a parent’s death or following paren-
tal divorce, the child most in need of parental attention and
support may receive less, because of the legal battle the parent is
engaged in.  Further, as a practical matter, parents may need to
take time from caring for their child in order to earn extra money
to pay for the lawsuit.
Another source of distress to children stems from the adults’
talk about the lawsuit.  If the child is seeing the grandparents, per-
haps under a temporary order of visitation, she may hear (or over-
hear) the grandparents speak in a critical or demeaning way about
the parent.  Animosity between parties to such lawsuits is inevitable,
and the suppression of all expression of that animosity may be too
much to expect of either grandparent or parent.
Denigration aside, visits to the grandparents under a tempo-
rary court order may be extremely uncomfortable for the child,
knowing as she does that her parents do not want her to be there
52. 791 N.E. 532, 547 (Ill. 2003); see also Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2 473 (Cal.
1996); Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727 (1996) (it is important to child’s welfare how
well custodial parent fares; acknowledging it may be better to sacrifice non-custodial
parent’s “accustomed close involvement with children’s everyday life” to further “the
custodial parent’s efforts to start a new life or to form a new family unit”).
53. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS
COPE WITH DIVORCE 215-21 (1980).
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and are actively opposing the visitation in court.  “Every time that a
child departs the parental home for visitation that has been or-
dered by the court, the anger felt by the parents who must relin-
quish the child and the anger felt by the grandparents who must
take the child under such circumstances will exacerbate the emo-
tional wounds inflicted on all participants during the initial
battle.”54
A child may feel unsettled by the basic idea of the litigation:
that his parent’s sense of what is best for him is being challenged;
that his parent is not in charge, but must submit to a judge’s deci-
sion; and that the usual source of authority in the family, the par-
ent, can be displaced.  Near-absolute parental authority is the norm
for childhood, especially for younger children, and children need
the security that such authority gives them.55
Grandparent visitation litigation is a variant of traditional cus-
tody and visitation fights, aptly termed “poisonous” by an Albany
family court judge.56  Like custody battles between warring parents,
grandparent visitation cases are sometimes fought not just over the
children, but using the children.  In Wilson v. McGlinchey, the Appel-
late Division, Third Department found that the relations between
the petitioning grandparents and their married daughter and son-
in-law were marked by “obvious, albeit controlled, hostility during
visitation and by the use of the child as a pawn in their ongoing
personal battle.”  The court concluded: “Exposing Sarah [the
child] to the coldness, stress, tension and battling hostility which
have characterized . . . the parties’ interactions . . . is not in her best
interest.”57
In grandparent visitation cases, the conflict itself affects the
child’s ability to benefit from contact with the grandparent.  It is
wrongheaded to presume that contact like that which occurs in har-
monious, non-litigating families will also occur in combative, litigat-
54. David A. Martindale, Troxel v. Granville: A Nonjusticiable Dispute, 41 FAM. CT.
REV. 88, 89 (2003).
55. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN et al, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 25 (The
Free Press 1979); Andrew S. Watson, Children, families, and courts: Before the Best Interests of
the Child and Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REV. 653 (1980).
56. Laura LL. v. Robert LL., 719 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Fam. Ct. 2000).
57. Wilson v. McGlinchey, 760 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
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ing families.58  As psychologist David A. Martindale observes,
“When, in the name of preserving relationships between children
and others whom we deem to be important, we expose children to
overt disharmony between their parents and members of the ex-
tended family, we run the risk of doing more harm than good.”59
Finally, children may be troubled by their own role in the liti-
gation.  They are often assigned a law guardian and invited to talk
to the judge.60  If in the course of litigation, they are asked to
choose between the contending adults, they risk loyalty conflicts:
Children are likely to encounter loyalty conflicts during
the judicial proceedings, and if a visitation petition is
granted loyalty conflicts are likely to be maintained over
time as the child remains the focus of the intergenera-
tional conflict.  Because a child already experiences dis-
tress owing to the triggering conditions linked to a
visitation petition (e.g., parental divorce or death), it is
hard to see how further legal conflict between family
members can assist the child in coping.61
A child who contradicts the wishes of a parent may suffer pa-
rental disapproval, or worse, a sense of having betrayed the key fig-
ure in his or her life.
F. Financial burdens affecting parenting
In a society in which a middle class mother must choose be-
tween buying medicines for herself and a place in an after-school
tennis program for her son,62 forcing parents to pay the high costs
of litigation can put severe strains on the family budget.
58. Martindale, supra note 54, at 88 (concluding that “the incalculable benefits to
children that are derived from their interactions with members of the extended family
are only realized when the relationships between the extended family and the nuclear
family are reasonably harmonious”).
59. Id. at 89.
60. See Wenskoski v. Wenskoski, 699 N.Y.S.2d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Shadders
v. Brock, 420 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Fam. Ct. 1979).
61. Ross A. Thompson, et al, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Legalizing the Ties that
Bind, 44 Am. Psychologist 1217, 1220 (1989).
62. Stephanie Strom, For Middle Class, Health Insurance Becomes a Luxury, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003 at 33 (describing financial plight and choices that working parents
in America face because of the high costs of health insurance).
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Attorneys in New York charge substantial fees.63  Courts lack
the statutory authority for fee-shifting in grandparent visitation
cases, so parents bear the full brunt of these fees.64  Reported cases
in New York fail to reveal parents’ legal fees, but other states’ cases
show them to be substantial: a California father incurred attorney’s
fees and costs of $69,950.87 in defending against a grandmother’s
efforts to obtain custody of his child.65  Other professionals in these
cases also charge significant fees.  A Kings County court awarded a
law guardian in a grandparent visitation case payment at the rate of
$200 per hour; a social worker in the same case was awarded pay-
ment at the rate of $90 per hour.66
The high costs of litigation reduce parental autonomy by re-
ducing parental choice.  In Troxel, Justice Anthony Kennedy recog-
nized the costs of litigation as a matter of deep concern for parents
compelled to defend a grandparent visitation lawsuit.  “If a single
parent who is struggling to raise a child is faced with visitation de-
mands from a third party, the attorney’s fees alone might destroy
her hopes and plans for the child’s future.”67  Working parents
have present day expenses and try to save for the future when they
can.  The biggest future expense, for many, is a college education
for the children.  Funding a lawsuit may mean spending all of one’s
savings, leaving nothing for the children’s future education.
Cost plays a role in limiting parents’ options in the litigation.
Indeed, this litigation offers parents Solomon-like dilemmas.  The
63. Parents who seek an experienced attorney may face very substantial attorney
fees.  As an example, Tracy Wilde, parent and party to Wilde v. Wilde, 775 A.2d 535
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), paid $350 per hour in attorney fees, for a total of
$86,000.  Telephone interview with Tracy Wilde (January 4, 2004).  Studies have shown
that legal costs have led low and moderate income Americans to forego needed legal
services. See Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 719, 724-25 (2001); Janet Stidman Eveleth, Is Middle Class America Denied Access to
Justice?, 29 Md. B.J. 44, 45 (1996). On rare occasions, an appellate court will mention
the problem. See, e.g., Meyer v. Meyer, 441 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Sin-
sabaugh v. Heinerscheid, 428 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (Foley, J.,
concurring).
64. Follum v. Follum, 755 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). Grandparents also
must pay their own fees, but they can take the cost into account in deciding whether to
litigate; parents who are forced into the lawsuit cannot.
65. In re Marriage of Perry, 61 Cal. App. 4th 295, 311 (1998).
66. Principato v. Lombardi, N.Y.L.J., September 3, 2003 at 19 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County).
67. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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more parents fear grandparent contact as a threat to their child,
the more they will choose to sacrifice their own and the child’s ba-
sic material well-being, now and in the future, in order to fight the
grandparent lawsuit.  The pressure of high costs may lead an eco-
nomically pressed parent to settle a case by offering visitation,
against her better parental judgment, in order to avoid bankrupt-
ing the family.68  Other parents may choose to abandon savings, go
into debt, and forego purchases of clothing, after school programs,
and vacations in order to buy more litigation services.  A Maine trial
judge put the matter succinctly in Rideout v. Riendeau: “If a parent
were required to defend against such [a grandparent visitation] suit
they may have to make sacrifices that are detrimental to the child.
For example, instead of being able to buy the child a winter jacket,
the parent may have to pay an up-front fee to the attorney.”69
The problem of cost is compounded for many parents by the
timing of the lawsuit.  Grandparents have automatic standing under
DRL § 72 to bring visitation lawsuits after the death of either one of
the grandchild’s parents.  The death of a parent, however, often
brings its own significant economic distress to the surviving parent.
Litigation costs, on top of the losses occasioned, for example, by the
death of a wage-earning parent, may be crushing.
Similarly, a visitation lawsuit that follows parental divorce im-
poses new costs on top of the economic toll of the divorce itself.
Single mothers with custody routinely suffer a decrease in their
standard of living after divorce, and often have difficulty collecting
child support payments.70  For a family of limited means, divorce
itself can “result, post-divorce, in circumstances more closely resem-
68. For a case in a which judge reported that finances led two mothers strongly
opposed to capitulate, see Farag v. Malaty, 2001 WL 1263324 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001) (dis-
cussing Doe v. Smith, 595 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Fam. Ct. 1993)). The imbalance of resources
often favors grandparents, who have more time and money to indulge themselves in
litigation to get what they want. See Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002) (quot-
ing Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 310 (Me. 2000) (Alexander, J. dissenting)).
Commenting on custody litigation, Professor Robert J. Levy and practitioner Gary
Skoloff state that “fairly and fully prepared and well-tried custody contests cost more
than most clients can afford or are willing to pay.  Money and lawyers’ interest in it
inevitably constrain lawyers’ behavior in custody cases.”  Robert J. Levy & Gary Skoloff,
Custody Doctrines and Custody Practice: A Divorce Practitioner’s View, 36 Fam. L.Q. 79, 84
(2002).
69. Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 310 (Me. 2000) (Alexander, J., dissenting).
70. Paul K. Legler, Child Support Enforcement Reform, 17 FairShare 8 (June 1997).
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bling actual economic suffering for both parties.”71  A single parent
striving to make ends meet after divorce will be hard pressed to pay
for the defense of a visitation lawsuit.
Finally, costs of the visitation lawsuit can diminish parenting
time.  The lawsuit itself requires a substantial investment of time
that is inevitably taken from at-home time rather than from work
time.  Even more significantly, high costs may cause a parent to
seek overtime work, or to take on a second job, to raise defense
funds.  As a consequence, the parent loses time with her child, and
the child is deprived of parental supervision and care.  For working
parents, this cost of litigation is a serious infringement on child
rearing.
G. The toll of judicial supervision, enforcement and relitigation
on family life
Grandparent visitation orders are exceedingly long term.  If
not modified or terminated in future litigation, the order lasts for
the remaining years of the child’s minority.  For young children,
the order can last well over a decade, rivaling the length of some
school desegregation orders.72
Courts are ill equipped to supervise family relationships, and it
is not surprising that visitation orders issuing after hostile litigation
generate continuing enforcement issues.73  As the Supreme Court
of Vermont has observed, “The ability to enforce an order, and the
availability of contempt to redress a parent’s otherwise reasonable
decision on visitation, can allow the grandparent to assert consider-
able control over the family.  Grandparents may turn to the court
for relief each time they perceive the parent is not following the
court order and thereby ask the court to micromanage the parent’s
otherwise constitutionally protected right to raise the child free
from state interference.”74
Visitation orders are judicially-created experiments with the
family.  A judge is gambling that the burdens inflicted by interfer-
71. Sperling v. Sperling, 567 N.Y.S.2d 538, 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
72. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (broad scope of original
school system-wide order issued in 1985 reduced after ten years).
73. See, e.g., Wilson v. McGlinchey, 760 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Martin-
dale, supra note 54 (each forced visitation breeds renewed anger in the parties).
74. Glidden v. Conley, 820 A.2d 197, 206 (Vt. 2003).
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ence with parental autonomy, by litigation-heightened conflict be-
tween the generations, and by family financial stresses, will be
overcome by the positive effects of grandparent-grandchild contact.
Except in situations when the child desperately needs outside help,
the gamble is a chancy one.75  Family relationships are complicated,
and family problems resist easy solutions, court ordered or
otherwise.
When parties to a visitation lawsuit return to court, the judge
has to decide whether to continue the experiment, modify it, or
end it.  Parties may argue over whether the child was truly ill and
missed visits, whether the child’s changing schedule of extracurric-
ular and social activities requires adjustment of visitation, or
whether the grandparent has upset the child on visits.  The oppor-
tunities for relitigation are endless.  Determining the true facts of
each disputed incident is difficult enough; healing the breach of
trust between the parties that underlies the continuing friction is
far beyond the power of the court.
It is tempting for the court to try to identify the misbehaving
party who is not cooperating with visitation, but faultfinding only
exacerbates the ill-will between the parties.  Even if a parent is
found to be causing visitation problems, the court faces the task of
choosing a remedy.  Contempt of court proceedings allow the
judge to put the offending parent in jail.76  But such a move is con-
trary to the whole point of the court’s intervention, which is to do
75. For cases in which a visitation order had to be terminated after an unsuccess-
ful experience, see Janczuk v. Janczuk, 760 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003);
Liantonio v. Davanzo, 756 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 2003); Matter of Florence
L., N.Y.L.J., January 14, 2000, at 30 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County); Barry v. Chefales, 586
N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
76. Marallo v. Marallo, 513 N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (reducing mother’s
jail sentence from alternate weekends for six months to same for three months);
Thompson v. Vanaman, 515 A.2d 1254, 1256 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (sen-
tencing mother to ten days in jail for failure to comply with grandparent visitation or-
der).  While contempt proceedings do not often appear in the official reports, the
jailing of a parent occasionally attracts attention in the nation’s press. See Kimberley
Hayes Taylor, Mother Says She’ll Allow her 10-year old Daughter to Visit Her Grandmother; One
Night in Jail Was Enough to Halt a 4-year Feud Over Visitation Rights, MINN STAR TRIB., Jan
31, 1996 at 1A; Michael Shaw, Woman Wages Fight in Court for Right to See Granddaughter;
Mother has gone to jail rather than comply with court-ordered visitation; Hearing is set for Wednes-
day, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 12, 1999 at C2; Maimon Alan, Parents Struggle with
Court-ordered Grandparent Visitation, LOUISVILLE, KY. COURIER-JOURNAL, March 24, 2001.
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what is best for the child.  Putting a parent in jail is hardly a child-
friendly act.  Even the threat of imprisonment is frightening, and
dramatically increases the stress on the parent and on the family
unit.  If a parent is given the choice of complying with the order
rather than going to jail, she may “give in,” but the added resent-
ment and cost generated by the contempt proceedings further em-
bitters the parties, puts the child in the middle of the escalating
clash of wills of parent and grandparent, and communicates to the
child the depth of distrust felt by the parent toward the grandpar-
ent.77  What child wouldn’t feel anxiety over visitation so ardently
opposed by her parent?  What judge could feel confident that the
child’s best interests are being served by contempt proceedings in
these cases?
IV. THE FIVE CRITICAL ISSUES
The heavy burdens that grandparent visitation litigation im-
poses on parents and children, as described above, must inform any
discussion of the legal issues surrounding this litigation.  That these
burdens are relevant to the interpretation of New York’s statute can
hardly be in doubt, when that statute relies upon determinations of
“equity” and “the best interest of the child.”  That they are also rele-
vant to the constitutional questions raised in the course of visitation
proceedings is made clear by Justice Anthony Kennedy’s statement
in Troxel v. Granville:
It must be recognized . . . that a domestic relations pro-
ceeding in and of itself can constitute state intervention
that is so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that
the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make cer-
77. Some parents choose to endure a jail sentence.  In one case known to the
author, a bitter litigation (still pending in Nassau County, New York) has extended over
seven years, shadowing a child’s life from age three to age ten.  The parent in the case
was ordered to allow visitation, and later, on a motion for contempt, was sent to jail for
a week upon a finding that he was not cooperating in carrying out the court’s order.
The mutual hostility continues, and in the latest series of motions, the grandparents are
seeking a new contempt order, and the child’s father is seeking to terminate visitation
based on an independent mental health evaluator’s report that the grandparents are
telling the child that her father was somehow responsible for the child’s mother’s death
in an automobile accident.  The father estimates he has spent $70,000 in legal fees.
Author’s interview, March 21, 2003 (the parent showed me the documents in his case,
but requested anonymity).
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tain basic determinations for the child’s welfare becomes
implicated.  The best interests of the child standard has at
times been criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpre-
dictable results.  If a single parent who is struggling to
raise a child is faced with visitation demands from a third
party, the attorney’s fees alone might destroy her hopes
and plans for the child’s future.  Our system must con-
front more often the reality that litigation can itself be so
disruptive that constitutional protection may be required;
and I do not discount the possibility that in some in-
stances the best interests of the child standard may pro-
vide insufficient protection to the parent-child
relationship.78
With these understandings in mind, I proceed to a discussion
of five legal issues that require the attention of the courts of the
state of New York.
ISSUE #1:  Should New York’s “standing” provisions in grandparent
visitation cases require grandparents to make a significant threshold
showing before the state permits full scale litigation to proceed?
The Troxel plurality expressly agreed with Justice Kennedy’s
statement, and noted that the litigation costs incurred by the parent
“are without a doubt already substantial.”79  Rather than remanding
the case for further proceedings, “forcing the parties into addi-
tional litigation that would further burden Granville’s parental
right,”80 the Supreme Court chose to terminate the litigation in
favor of the parent.
Perhaps even more critical than putting an end to litigation,
however, is screening it at an initial stage, so that non-meritorious
cases do not proceed through the full litigation process.  If the liti-
gation itself burdens the constitutional right, as the previous sec-
tion of this essay demonstrates, state courts must make some effort
to limit the damage.  As Professor Andrew Watson trenchantly sug-
gested twenty-four years ago, courts must “deal with the issue of the
78. 530 U.S. 57, 101 (2000).
79. Id. at 75.
80. Id.
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permissible invocation threshold for the due process intrusion into
a family’s privacy.”81
A fair consideration of the burdens of litigation makes it im-
perative for New York to adopt effective threshold techniques for
screening out non-meritorious visitation claims.  Before fit parents
are put through stressful, lengthy, expensive and exhausting pro-
ceedings that challenge their constitutionally protected right to
raise their children without interference by the state, a court ought
to determine at the outset whether the litigation in fact is firmly
grounded.82
New York’s current statute makes a feeble attempt to limit
grandparent visitation litigation by providing two alternative
grounds for grandparent “standing.”  The first provides automatic
standing for grandparents when a grandchild’s parent has died.
The second gives all other grandparents standing to bring a visita-
tion claim whenever “equity would see fit to intervene.”
The problem with the automatic grant of standing is apparent:
it requires absolutely no inquiry at the outset of the case.  No mat-
ter how weak the relationship between the grandparent and the
grandchild, how deep the dysfunction in the extended family, or
how inappropriate visits might be for the child, the grandparent
has standing to sue.  No threshold showing on the merits must be
made, and the grandparent can force a full scale best interests trial.
Even a grandparent who has been grossly irresponsible can put a fit
parent through the rigors, privacy invasions, and high costs of this
litigation.83
81. Andrew S. Watson, Children, Families, and Courts: Before the Best Interests of the
Child and Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REV. 653, 673 n.77 (1980).
82. Several other states have embarked on this inquiry. See Glidden v. Conley, 820
A.2d 197 (Vt. 2003) (finding visitation “proceedings, and the potential for further pro-
ceedings . . . can be considered so burdensome to Glidden that his right to raise
Amanda without interference by the State is implicated.”); Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d
1052, 1065-66 (Mass. 2002); In re Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2003) (Iowa Supreme
Court requires threshold showing pursuant to state constitution).  The U.S. Supreme
Court recognized the drawbacks of adversarial family litigation in Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 604-610 (1979).
83. See, e.g., Ziarno v. Ziarno, 726 N.Y.S.2d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Matter of
Cecilia L., N.Y.L.J., Sept.15, 1998 at 30 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County) (“controlling, un-
forgiving and myopic” grandmother without reason blames children’s mother for death
of grandmother’s son; automatic standing).  Presumably a grandmother living with a
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The fact that a parent has died does not detract from the re-
maining parent’s autonomy and privacy rights. Troxel itself involved
a single parent whose partner had committed suicide.  The New
York statute may be assuming that the child who has lost a parent
has the need for attentive and consoling grandparents, but assump-
tions based upon the ideal family, as Troxel reminds us, cannot dis-
lodge the constitutional liberty of parents to raise their own
children.84  Moreover, responsible surviving parents may choose
different ways to help their children with this crisis; courts do not
have a basis for intervening in the family simply because a parent
dies.85
Curing the problem of automatic standing may be accom-
plished in different ways.  This element of the statute may be de-
clared unconstitutional (under the federal due process clause, or
under the state constitution), leaving the rest of the statute intact.86
Or the court may construe the “best interest of the child” language
of the statute, which covers all cases regardless of how standing is
achieved, to require the state courts to perform a merits-based
screening inquiry, separate and apart from the statute’s standing
requirement.
New York’s second basis for standing, when “equity would see
fit to intervene,” potentially can be more protective of the parent,
but has its own problems.  Like “the best interest of the child,” this
test turns on a broad, indeterminate phrase, open to subjective in-
terpretations and to dilution in the hands of judges who favor
convicted sex offender, see Glidden, 820 A.2d 197, would have automatic standing in
New York if one of children’s parents were not living.
84. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
85. “We recognize that the death of a biological parent may be a traumatic event
for a child and that a family may deal with that tragic event in many different ways.
Some parents may decide that counseling is beneficial for the child; others may disa-
gree.  Some parents may decide that the child should spend more time with the de-
ceased biological parent’s grandparents, siblings or close friends.  Others may restrict
those relationships.”  Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510, 516 (Fla. 1998).  Some grandpar-
ents may become very hostile, blaming the surviving parent for the death.  Matter of
Cecilia L., N.Y.L.J., Sept.15, 1998 at 30 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County); Smith v. Jones, 587
N.Y.S.2d 506 (Fam.Ct. Nassau County 1992).
86. See, e.g., Von Eiff, 720 So.2d at 516; In re Raquel Marie X, 76 N.Y.2d 387 (1990).
All grandparents would then have to satisfy the equity-based standing requirement.
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grandparent visitation as their ideological preference.87  At least
one Appellate Division case seems to have narrowed the focus of
equity standing to the question of whether the grandparent has
some existing relationship with the child or has no such relation-
ship but has tried to create one and been rebuffed by the parent.88
But a grandparent with no relationship of significance to the child
should be denied standing.  There is no basis on which a grandpar-
ent who is a virtual stranger to the child can prove visits will be in
the child’s best interest.  If the grandparent has an existing relation-
ship with the child, this alone should not suffice; the grandparent
should be required to show facts that indicate a compelling reason
exists for ordering visitation.  Equity should strive to ensure that the
heavy burdens of litigation detailed above will not be imposed un-
necessarily, and unconstitutionally, upon the parent and child.
Another Appellate Division has suggested that the equity-based
standing test requires the same evidence as the best interest test
and so the two issues should be tried together in one hearing.89
This seems consistent with the statements made about equity stand-
ing in Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., to the effect that all relevant facts must
be examined in the standing inquiry, including the “nature and
basis of the parents’ objection to visitation” and the “nature and
extent of the grandparent-grandchild relationship.”90  This inter-
pretation renders the equity test valueless as a barrier to litigation.
Equity standing, if it is to screen out cases, must have some
teeth.  Without a narrowing interpretation, it stands now, in the
words of one family court judge, as “an incentive to litigation.”91
Grandparent plaintiffs should be required to show that their claims
are likely to succeed on the merits.  The constitutional presumption
that fit parents are acting in their child’s best interest should oper-
ate at this stage, to eliminate cases that do not appear to involve
extraordinary and compelling circumstances that justify overriding
87. Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S. 2d 503 (Fam. Ct. 2000); Toney v. Rendace-
Toney, 228 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 2002 at 35 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County).
88. Augusta v. Carousso, 617 N.Y.S.2d 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), lv. app. dism., 85
N.Y.2d 857 (1995).
89. Luma v. Kawalchuk, 658 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); see also Smolen v.
Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Fam. Ct. 2000) (hearing on both issues at once is common-
place in New York).
90. Emanuel S., 577 N.E.2d at 39.
91. Farag, 2001 WL 1263324.
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the parent’s wishes.92  In addition, stricter pleading requirements
that demand a detailed, verified complaint from grandparents
might help courts identify weak cases.93  If the parents choose to
contest the facts at this stage, a hearing can be held to resolve fac-
tual differences.  Grandparents who fail to demonstrate a likeli-
hood of success on the merits should not be allowed to proceed.
ISSUE #2:  Should grandparent visitation orders be subject to
“strict scrutiny” review?
As Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurring opinion in
Troxel,94 “strict scrutiny” is the appropriate standard for judging in-
fringements of the fundamental right recognized by the Supreme
Court.  Several state high courts have come to this conclusion as
well.95  At least one commentator, however, has suggested the
Court has moved away from strict scrutiny review in substantive due
process cases involving family rights, based upon the Court’s sup-
posed “pragmatic” view of family privacy.96  This, however, does not
seem justified by a close reading of Troxel and its predecessors.
Significantly, the Troxel plurality’s discussion of substantive due
process doctrine expressly invoked two Supreme Court precedents
that recognized the strict scrutiny standard.  Justice O’Connor’s
opinion, quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, observed that the consti-
tution provides “heightened protection against government inter-
ference” with substantive rights recognized under the due process
clause.97 Reno v. Flores,98 immediately cited next, expressly states —
at the precise page cited by the plurality — that the substantive
component of the due process clause “forbids the government to
infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter
what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tai-
92. See infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.  The basis for a requirement of
extraordinary, compelling circumstances is suggested in the analysis of Issue #3.
93. See, e.g., Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1065-66 (Mass. 2002).
94. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80.
95. See, e.g., Roth, 789 A.2d 431, 442 (Conn. 2002).
96. See David D. Meyer, Who Gets the Children? Parental Rights after Troxel v. Granville:
Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing American Family, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 711 (2001).
97. 530 U.S. at 64 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
98. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 71 Side A      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 71 Side A      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR305.txt unknown Seq: 29 16-APR-04 14:32
2004] GRANDPARENT VISITATION LAW 517
lored to serve a compelling state interest.”99  This is an unambigu-
ous statement endorsing the use of the strict scrutiny standard.
Further support for the use of strict scrutiny comes from the
fact that the plurality expressly classified the right of parents to the
care, custody, and control of their children as “fundamental” and
noted with special emphasis that it was “perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”100  Justice
O’Connor also observed that “the State’s recognition of an
independent third-party interest in a child can place a substantial
burden on the traditional parent-child relationship.”101  This ech-
oes the joint opinion of Justices Souter, Kennedy and O’Connor in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,102 which held that
“substantial obstacles” and “undue burdens” on the exercise of a
fundamental right would result in a finding of unconsti-
tutionality.103
Justice Souter, concurring in Troxel, indicated that the parental
interest in visitation decisions is an extremely significant one: “The
strength of a parent’s interest in controlling a child’s associates is as
obvious as the influence of personal associations on the develop-
ment of the child’s social and moral character.”104  Exposing chil-
dren to certain people, on a regular basis (and often with overnight
visits and longer vacation stays) entails exposing the children to
those people’s ideas, their personalities, their opinions, their
prejudices, their lifestyles, their child rearing practices, and, per-
haps, their vices.  Caring parents take seriously the responsibility of
determining who will actively participate in the child’s life.  Over-
riding such parental choices is no small matter.  As the Supreme
Court of North Dakota put it in Hoff v. Berg,105 “Deciding when,
under what conditions, and with whom their children may associate
99. Id. at 301-302 (emphasis in original).
100. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
101. Id at 64.
102. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
103. Id. at 877; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767 n.8 (1991)
(Souter, J., concurring).
104. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78.
105. 595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1999).
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is among the most important rights and responsibilities of
parents.”106
The burdens imposed by grandparent visitation litigation and
by visitation orders that can span very long periods of time make
strict scrutiny the best choice for assessing the constitutionality of
these orders.
ISSUE #3:  How much “special weight” must the parent’s decision be
given, to give effect to the constitutional presumption that parents
act in the best interest of their children?
The Troxel court did not explore the magnitude of the “special
weight” that it held must be given parental decisions on visitation.
In some prior opinions of the Court, the term has been invoked to
signal substantial deference.  For example, in Rodrigues v. Hawaii,
the Court stated that “special weight” is given to a verdict of acquit-
tal, absolutely precluding a new trial.107  In Guardians Ass’n v. Civil
Serv. Comm., the Court attributed “special weight” to well-estab-
lished administrative interpretations of a statute, requiring courts to
defer to the agency even if the court would choose to interpret the
statute differently.108  At the least, this indicates the term can imply
considerable deference to those whose opinion is entitled to “spe-
cial weight” in court.
In Troxel, the Court linked the special weight requirement to
the presumption that parents act in their children’s best interest.109
This presumption, grounded in Supreme Court precedent,110 is it-
self of constitutional dimension.  But the presumption’s strength is
also an unresolved issue.
Applying the special weight requirement in Troxel itself was not
difficult, because the facts revealed that the Washington trial court
had given no weight at all to the parental decision.111  The plurality
did not need to say anything about the amount of evidence that
106. Id. at 291.  Moreover, the time involved in visitation is not trivial, especially to
a parent with work commitments and limited time to spend with her own child.
107. 469 U.S. 1078, 1080 (1984).
108. 463 U.S. 582, 621 (1983).
109. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 58.
110. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979).
111. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 72 Side A      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 72 Side A      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR305.txt unknown Seq: 31 16-APR-04 14:32
2004] GRANDPARENT VISITATION LAW 519
would suffice to overcome the presumption.  It merely recognized
that giving zero weight to the parent’s opinion, and to the presump-
tion that supports it, is obviously insufficient.
Presumptions in the law can range widely in effect, from con-
clusive presumptions to presumptions that are rebuttable with any
credible evidence that runs contrary to the presumption.  New
York’s legendary Chief Judge, Benjamin Cardozo, dealt with the
problem of defining the proper scope of a legal presumption in In
re Findlay.112  New York law presumed that a child born to a married
woman is the legitimate child of her marriage to her husband.
Looking at the precedents, Cardozo found the presumption could
be rebutted, but he observed that “there have been varying state-
ments of the cogency of the evidence sufficient to repel it.”113
Some courts had said the contrary evidence had to be clear and
convincing, others that it must be “strong and irresistible,” still
others that it must be proved “beyond all reasonable doubt.”  Car-
dozo then ventured his own conclusion: “What is meant by these
pronouncements, however differently phrased, is this, and nothing
more, that the presumption will not fail unless common sense and
reason are outraged by a holding that it abides.”114
The strong presumption of legitimacy in Findlay stemmed from
a strong public policy in its favor.  As the Court of Appeals had pre-
viously stated in Hynes v. McDermott, “The law presumes morality,
and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage; legitimacy,
and not bastardy.”115
How strong the presumption should be favoring a parent’s
childrearing decisions depends in large measure on the perceived
importance of the public policy behind it.  If the policy is deemed
of only limited significance, the presumption can be brushed aside
by “the mere balance of probability.”116  If the policy is of great con-
sequence, the presumption should be a formidable obstacle to par-
ties seeking to overthrow it.
The presumption that parents act in their child’s best interest
is premised upon deeply embedded American beliefs and legal tra-
112. 253 N.Y. 1 (1930).
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N.Y. 451, 459 (1883).
116.  Id. (quoting Lord Lyndhurst in Morris v. Davies, 5 Clark & F. 163 (1836)).
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ditions.  Culturally and legally, we value parental autonomy and re-
spect family privacy.  “The history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the
nurture and upbringing of their children.  This primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established be-
yond debate as an enduring American tradition.”117  Parents raise
children, not the State.  “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first with the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder.”118  Applying these sentiments in a
grandparent visitation case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
declared: “Keeping State intervention in the matter of child rearing
to a minimum, consistent with necessity, is essential to the Ameri-
can ideal.”119
The authors Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J.
Solnit, in their book Before the Best Interests of the Child, cite the psy-
chological needs of children as a reason to support a strong degree
of state deference to parental decisions.  “Children . . . react even to
temporary infringement of parental autonomy with anxiety, dimin-
ishing trust, loosening of emotional ties, or an increasing tendency
to be out of control.  The younger the child, and the greater his
own helplessness and dependence, the stronger is his need to expe-
rience his parents as his lawgivers — safe, reliable, all-powerful, and
independent.”120  They caution that “any interference with family
privacy alters the relationships between family members and under-
mines the effectiveness of parental authority.”121
117. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
118. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
119. Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D.1999).
120. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN et al., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 25 (1980).
121. Id. at 24. See also Watson, Children, Families, and Courts: Before the Best Interests of
the Child and Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REV. 653 (1980) (suggesting the autonomy of
parents should be near-absolute).  “Parental authority is first and foremost a biological
derivative that predates any external legal structure.” Id. at 666.  “[L]aws can easily
thwart or complicate parental responses.  For this reason alone, there should be great
reluctance to disrupt the near-absolute authority parents exercise in the child-rearing
process.” Id. at 667.  He notes that laws like compulsory school attendance, child labor
bans, and immunization requirements “set precise limits on parental decisions, thus
minimizing the discretion of the state to intrude,” and focus on the compelling needs
of the state, rather than the amorphous best interests of the child. Id. See also Emily
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The New York Court of Appeals has long embraced the impor-
tance of family privacy and independence from unwarranted gov-
ernment intrusion.  In 1936 the Court wrote: “No end of difficulties
would arise should judges try to tell parents how to bring up their
children.  Only when moral, mental, and physical conditions are so
bad as seriously to affect the health or morals of children should
the courts be called upon to act.”122  The parent-child relationship
itself cannot be readily subjected to oversight and regulation, for it
“is one of the strongest, yet most delicate, and most inviolable of all
relationships.”123
State intervention into childrearing has been extremely cir-
cumspect, limited to the universally recognized and essential state
interests in protecting the health and safety of children.  These in-
terests are most apparent in state laws prohibiting child abuse and
neglect,124 requiring safety measures such as seat belts,125 restrict-
ing child labor,126 and allowing youth access to medical aid to treat
venereal diseases without parental notice.127
Even in the context of child neglect law, where the state’s inter-
est in a child’s health and safety is most compelling, the state Court
of Appeals has mandated substantial deference to parental deci-
sions.  In In re Hofbauer,128 the Court ruled that parents could not
be ordered to provide their child with conventional medical treat-
ment, even though the alternative treatment they chose involved a
drug (laetrile) that had been widely criticized by the government
Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279
(2000).
122. People ex.rel Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 287-88 (1936).
123. Corey L. v. Martin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383, 392 (1978). A California court stated that
one purpose behind the legal presumption favoring parental autonomy “is to diminish
the uncertainties and discontinuities that can afflict the parent-child relationship when-
ever third parties (lawyers as well as judges) episodically intrude through an ill-
equipped adversarial process in which decisions are subject to reconsideration and
eventual appellate review.” Mentry v. Mentry, 142 Cal. App.3d 260 (1983).
124. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (2003).
125. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (McKinney 2003).
126. See N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 130-44 (McKinney 2003).
127. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH. LAW § 2305(2) (2003) (“A licensed physician, or in a
hospital, a staff physician, may diagnose, treat or prescribe for a person under the age
of twenty-one years without the consent or knowledge of the parents or guardian of said
person, where such person is infected with a sexually transmissible disease, or has been
exposed to infection with a sexually transmissible disease.”).
128. 47 N.Y.2d 648 (1979).
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and the medical profession.  The parent’s decision, the Court
wrote, must be accorded “great deference,” and must prevail so
long as they have “provided for their child a treatment which is
recommended by their physician and which has not been totally
rejected by all responsible medical authority.”129
In reversing the lower court’s finding of child neglect, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the judicial inquiry
cannot be posed in terms of whether the parent has made
a “right” or “wrong” decision, for the present state of the
practice of medicine . . . very seldom permits such defini-
tive conclusions.  Nor can a court assume the role of a
surrogate parent and establish as the objective criteria
with which to evaluate a parent’s decision its own judg-
ment as to the exact method or degree of medical treat-
ment which should be provided, for such standard is
fraught with subjectivity.130
If Hofbauer mandates great deference in the medical neglect
context, it is hard to justify less deference in the grandparent visita-
tion context, where decisions do not involve matters of life and
death.  The Hofbauer court’s respect for parental autonomy, its con-
cerns about judicial subjectivity, and its acknowledgment of the dif-
ficulty of identifying a “right” or “wrong” decision, are even more
pertinent in the grandparent visitation context.  Interventions in
medical neglect cases are grounded in medical science.  Interven-
tions in parents’ decisions about child rearing are grounded in un-
certain social science, where practitioners differ widely among
themselves, engage in constant debate, and rarely converge on ten-
ets of child raising that enjoy universal acceptance.131
Significantly, the Court of Appeals in Ronald FF v. Cindy GG
identified the right “to choose those with whom her child associ-
ates” as a “fundamental right” that cannot be overcome except in
furtherance of “some compelling state purpose.”132  The case re-
129. Id. at 655-56.
130. Id.
131. See ANN HULBERT, RAISING AMERICA: EXPERTS, PARENTS, AND A CENTURY OF AD-
VICE ABOUT CHILDREN (Knopf Publishing Group 2003); STACY SCHIFF, Because I Said So,
N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW, April 27, 2003 at 9.
132. 70 N.Y.2d 141, 144-45 (1987).  Because of the parent’s fundamental right, the
court refused to extend Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 (1976), which allowed cus-
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jected a visitation claim by a third party acting as a co-parent to a
child.  If co-parents are not allowed to seek visitation rights, it fol-
lows that ordinary grandparents should not be allowed to seek
them, absent compelling circumstances.133
Hofbauer’s concern about subjective judicial judgments has
been echoed in grandparent visitation opinions of the highest
courts of several states.  The Tennessee Supreme Court, in an early
landmark case requiring a showing of harm before grandparent vis-
itation could be ordered, wrote of the trial judge: “Reflecting on his
own relationship with his grandparents, the trial judge insisted that
he, too, would sue for visitation rights if his children denied him
access to his grandchildren.”134  The Court expressly disapproved
the “unquestioning judicial assumption that grandparent-
grandchild relationships always benefit children.”135  Recognizing
the temptation to rely on personal beliefs in judging these cases,
the Florida Supreme Court observed: “It is not our judicial role to
comment on the general wisdom of maintaining intergenerational
relationships.  We must refrain from expressing our personal
thoughts as either grandparents or future grandparents.”136  In In re
Howard, the Iowa Supreme Court condemned reliance on “senti-
mentality” in deciding these cases.137
In New York, some trial judges have been so committed to
grandparent visitation rights that they’ve granted visitation without
even bothering to hold hearings.138  Other judges have displayed
their own personal preference for visitation in their opinions, as did
a Jefferson County Family Court judge who wrote of his determina-
tion to enforce “the moral obligations of familial relationships,”
tody to be awarded to a non-parent in the event of “extraordinary circumstances,” to a
claim for visitation.
133. Breaking a child’s bonds with those acting as co-parents can cause trauma to
the child, and granting visitation in such situations should, in the author’s opinion,
qualify as a compelling state purpose. See the persuasive dissent of Judge Kaye in Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
134. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn.1993).
135. Id. at 581.
136. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1277 (Fla. 1996).
137. 661 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2003).
138. See Schoffman v. Schoffman, 524 N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Quintela
v. Ranieri, 499 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
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which he believed particularly included visits with grandparents.139
A Nassau County Supreme Court judge in another grandparent visi-
tation case quoted this remark with approval.140
Across the country, judges’ subjective beliefs about the value of
grandparents have tainted many visitation cases.  An Ohio judge
who gave no weight at all to a parent’s decision on visitation showed
his unthinking adherence to the cause of grandparent rights by re-
ferring to the child’s mother as a “third party.”141  A Michigan
judge ordering visitation stated: “Grandmothers are very important.
I don’t say that just because I am one, but I do believe they are
important.  I have a niece who doesn’t have any and she borrows
grandparents . . . .”142  A California appeals court criticized the trial
judge’s “vague generalizations about the inherent goodness of a lov-
ing relationship between grandparents and grandchildren.”143  An-
other California judge ignored facts showing no significant
relationship between the child and grandparents and disregarded
evidence that the grandparents sometimes yelled and cursed dur-
ing telephone conversations with the child and her mother; in-
stead, he granted the visitation petition with the comment: “I don’t
see any problem with the [grandparent] being similar to a Disney-
land dad. . . . I am a grandparent.  That seems to be what we do for
grandchildren.”144
Justice O’Connor’s Troxel opinion similarly noted the trial
judge’s reliance on personal experience.  She quoted the Washing-
ton state judge as saying: “I look back on some personal exper-
iences. . . .  We always spent as kids a week with one set of
grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] it happened
139. Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (Fam. Ct. 2000). The judge
claimed to find support for this notion in Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, itself.
140. Toney v. Rendace-Toney, N.Y.L.J., Sept.30, 2002 at 35, (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County).
141. Oliver v. Feldner, 776 N.E.2d 499, 509 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (quoting and
reversing the trial court).
142. DeRose v. DeRose, 643 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Mich. Ct. App.2002), aff’d, 666
N.W.2d 636, 638 (Mich.2003) (quoting trial judge).
143. In re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
144. Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 146-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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to work out in our family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable
experience.”145
A judge’s subjective beliefs favoring grandparent claims, even if
not openly expressed in a written opinion, can influence the
judge’s decision in various ways.  The trial judge has great discre-
tion in assessing the credibility of witnesses, in resolving conflicting
testimony, in attaching significance to submitted evidence, and in
weighing recommendations of law guardians and forensic evalu-
ators.  All of these tasks may be influenced by subjective beliefs and
values of the judge.146  Unfortunately, there is little likelihood of
detection of these influences in the process of appellate review, for,
as the Court of Appeals noted in a custody case, “weighing of these
various factors requires an evaluation of the testimony, character
and sincerity of all the parties involved in this type of dispute . . . .
In matters of this character, the findings of the nisi prius court must
be accorded the greatest respect.”147
The “best interest of the child” test plays a role in facilitating
subjective judging in these cases.  The test is useful in the divorce
context, where a judge must choose between two parents who have
strong primary attachments to their child.  Psychological tenets
about the significance of bonding with a primary caretaker, the
value of liberal visitation with the non-custodial parent, and the im-
portance of nurturing skills, provide a sound basis for decision mak-
ing in these cases.148  But when dealing with secondary figures in
the child’s life (and most grandparents are secondary figures149)
145. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61 (quoting from the record’s Verbatim Report of
Proceedings).
146. For discussion of the psychological aspects of custody decisions, see See Ste-
phen A. Newman, A Tale of Two Cases: Reflections on Psychological and Institutional Influ-
ences on Child Custody Decisions, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 661 (1989).
147. Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 173 (N.Y. 1982) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
148. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PAR-
ENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 215-221 (1980); GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (The Free Press 1973).
149. The most significant national study of grandparenting found that the vast ma-
jority of grandparents, dubbed “companionate grandparents” by the researchers, pre-
ferred lives that were independent from their children and grandchildren; they spent
regular but very limited time with the grandchildren in occasional visitation, largely on
“recreational or ceremonial occasions.” Grandparents were “only rarely a primary
source of psychological support for the child.” ANDREW J. CHERLIN & FRANK F. FUR-
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there is no way to predict the impact of such relationships on the
child’s life or to declare a parental decision against exposure to
such figures to be wrong, except in a narrow band of cases where
the child’s needs for help or protection are very clear.150  Parents
regularly make decisions not only about grandparents, but about
uncles, neighbors, coaches, nannies, tutors, playmates, and others
who seek contact with their children, and judges rightly have no say
in those choices.  Such parental decisions are based on non-scien-
tific judgments that parents must make using intuition, observation,
experience, and assessment of risk.  In the absence of extraordi-
nary, compelling circumstances, judges have no reliable basis for
interfering with such decisions.151
The problem of subjective judgment is compounded by the in-
fluential power of cultural stereotype.  Grandparents enjoy a posi-
tive image in society.152  They present themselves to outsiders as
kindly and loving, motivated only by the desire to see their
grandchildren.  The stereotype is supported by many adults’ genu-
inely positive experiences with their grandparents.  But the over-
whelming majority of American grandparents do not have to sue in
order to see their grandchildren.  It is only when there is serious
animosity and a breakdown of intergenerational relationships that
STENBERG, JR., THE NEW AMERICAN GRANDPARENT: A PLACE IN THE FAMILY, A LIFE APART
169, 183-84 (1992).
150. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 725 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Fam.Ct. 2001) (grandmother in-
volved with child since birth, father is in prison, teenage mother is depressed, finds
parenting difficult, is receiving preventive services from child welfare agency after
charges of neglect against her).
151. For further discussion of the limits of the best interest test, see Stephen A.
Newman, Overburdened Child’s Best-Interest Test, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 2003 at 2.
152. Thompson et al., Grandparent visitation rights, FAM.& CONCILIATION CTS REV. 9,
13 (1991):
Despite the very limited research evidence pertinent to these issues [of
whether children will benefit from grandparent visitation or be harmed by
its denial], opinion concerning the importance of the grandparent-
grandchild relationship abounds in court decisions concerning grandpar-
ent visitation [citations omitted].  These opinions often draw on popular
and traditional portrayals of the grandparenting role as family historian,
mentor and teacher of grandchildren, source of unconditional love and
comfort, indulgent playmate, and mediator of family conflict.
. . . Research findings indicate that contemporary grandparenting is consid-
erably more ill defined, individualized, and contingent than traditional por-
trayals would suggest.
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parents and grandparents go to court to resolve their disputes.
These cases do not present the typical extended family, but the
deeply troubled extended family.
Stereotypes about grandparents inhibit honest and candid dis-
cussion.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Troxel acknowledged the
difficulties of family life in modern America, but only mentioned
the troubles of single parents who rely upon grandparents to serve
as parental surrogates for their children.  She did not express the
unpleasant realities about members of the older generation who
defy the cultural stereotype — those grandparents who are selfish,
unkind, and controlling; those who disapprove of their children’s
spouses and continue to express their disapproval for years; those
who relentlessly criticize their own children’s parenting; those who
oppressed and even abused their now adult children during child-
hood.  These grandparents exist, and appear in the reported
cases.153
New York should incorporate into its grandparent visitation
law a substantive standard that requires substantial deference to pa-
rental choices about visitation, except in extraordinary circum-
stances where a child’s need for grandparent contact is
compellingly clear.  It can accomplish this by interpreting the “best
interest of the child” language in DRL § 72 to require this
showing.154
153. See, e.g., Canales v. Aulet, 744 N.Y.S.2d 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (grand-
mother’s disruptive, sometimes violent propensities); Farag, 2001 WL 1263324 (grand-
mother implicitly encourages father’s domestic assaults on mother, calls child by the
name of father’s ex-girlfriend rather than the child’s proper name); Grant v. Richard-
son, 697 N.Y.S.2d 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (grandmother denigrates children’s father;
her own husband is prone to domestic violence); Wenskoski v. Wenskoski, 699 N.Y.S.2d
150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (insensitive, meddling grandfather exacerbates child’s psy-
chological difficulties after parental divorce); C.M. v. M.M., 672 N.Y.S.2d 1012
(Fam.Ct.1998) (grandparent failed to protect child from abuse); Richard YY v. Sue Z.Z.,
673 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (grandfather fails to prevent sexual contact
between boys at his home); Luma v. Kawalchuk, 658 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(domineering and abusive grandfather); Smith v. Jones, 587 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Fam. Ct.
1992) (grandmother interferes with mother’s ability to parent, at vulnerable time for
child); Matter of Rita VV, 619 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (grandfather rejects
child due to Puerto Rican heritage).
154. Other states have interpreted their “best interests” tests to require a showing
of significant harm before grandparent visitation or custody is granted. Glidden v. Con-
ley, 820 A.2d 197 (Vt. 2003); Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2 1052 (Mass. 2002); Linder v. Lin-
der, 72 S.W.3d 841 (Ark. 2002); Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).  In New York,
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The Court of Appeals can reinforce this standard by adopting
an elevated standard of proof that requires grandparents to prove
their case for visitation by clear and convincing evidence, instead of
by a preponderance of the evidence.  The U.S. Supreme Court has
on rare occasion required a higher standard of proof in a civil law-
suit as a constitutional mandate.  The most relevant family law ex-
ample is Santosky v. Kramer.155  In that case, the Court, as a matter of
procedural due process, raised the standard of proof in a termina-
tion of parental rights suit initiated by the state of New York.  In so
doing, the Court balanced the importance of the parental interests,
the state interests, and the risk of error.  One of the Court’s con-
cerns in Santosky was the risk of judicial subjectivity in applying the
New York law’s vague legal standards, a problem that appears in
grandparent visitation suits as well.  Other considerations discussed
by the Court, however, were unique to the termination of parental
rights setting, such as the presence of the state as the party oppos-
ing the parents, and the exceedingly high stakes for parents of irre-
versible termination of rights to their children.
Although Santosky can be distinguished from grandparent visi-
tation cases, there is still a salutary function to be played by the
clear and convincing evidence standard in the visitation context.  A
higher standard of proof serves to support and protect parents’ sub-
stantive due process rights by signaling that the law is not indiffer-
ent to the risk of error with respect to the imposition of visitation
upon an unwilling parent.  As explained in Marriage of Peters:156
The degree of burden of proof applied in a particular sit-
uation is an expression of the degree of confidence soci-
ety wishes to require of the resolution of a question of
fact.  The burden of proof thus serves to allocate the risk
of error between the parties, and varies in proportion to
the gravity of the consequences of an erroneous resolu-
the Court of Appeals has long recognized the canon of statutory construction that calls
for construing a statute in a manner that “removes doubt of its constitutionality.”  Peo-
ple v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 385 (1943). For an excellent discussion of state decisions
requiring a showing of harm to the child on constitutional and statutory grounds, see
Joan Catherine Bohl, Grandparent Visitation Law Grows Up: The Trend Toward Awarding
Visitation Only When the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48 DRAKE L.REV. 279 (2000).
155. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
156. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493 (1997).
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tion.  Preponderance of the evidence results in the
roughly equal sharing of the risk of error.  To impose any
higher burden of proof demonstrates a preference for
one side’s interests.  Generally, facts are subject to a
higher burden of proof only where particularly important
individual interests or rights are at stake. . . .157
The constitutional liberty interests of parents is surely a “particu-
larly important individual interest” in grandparent visitation litiga-
tion.  An elevated standard of proof supports that interest, and in
addition, would discourage the initiation of such burdensome liti-
gation, curb judicial reliance on personal preferences and cultural
stereotypes, and restrain judicial interference in child rearing deci-
sions that are not susceptible to “right” and “wrong” judgments by
the state.
The higher standard of proof may be imposed as a matter of
state constitutional law or of the state high court’s own supervisory
authority.158
ISSUE #4:  What standard should be adopted for modification or
termination of grandparent visitation orders?
In Matter of Florence L.,159 a family court judge was asked by a
married couple to terminate a grandparent visitation order that
had been entered on consent a year and a half earlier.  The court
assumed the parents had to show “changed circumstances” in order
to challenge the continuation of the court’s initial order.
Parents seeking restoration of their constitutional child rearing
rights should not have the state place an obstacle in the way of this
effort, as a threshold showing of changed circumstances requires.
Instead, the state should be wary of extending its interference for
157. Id. at 495 (citations omitted).
158. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal.Rptr. 2d 127, 141-142 (2001) (stating,
“necessary to assure adequate deference is accorded to a fit parent’s decisions about
raising his or her children”); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002) (Supreme
Court of Connecticut imposes a clear and convincing standard of proof under its super-
visory powers).
159. N.Y.L.J., January 14, 2000, at 30 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County).
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too long, and at the least, freely permit parents ruled by court or-
ders to challenge those orders.160
The changed circumstances standard is derived from tradi-
tional custody disputes, when one parent must show that changed
circumstances justify modifying an existing custody order to serve
the best interest of the child.161  The child’s interest in stability is an
important factor weighing against modification in these cases.
The analogy to custody-visitation disputes between parents is
an obvious one, but it is inapt in some key respects.  First, in parent-
parent custody disputes, neither party has a superior right to the
child’s custody.162  In parent-grandparent visitation disputes, one
party, the parent, does have a superior constitutional right to make
child rearing decisions.163  The parent should be able to assert the
constitutional right whenever the compelling reason for overriding
it has passed.  There should be no presumption in favor of main-
taining the order.
Second, the child’s clear interest in a continuing, stable life
with a primary caretaking parent is very different from the child’s
interest in stability with an extended family visitor.  The latter inter-
est is countered by the child’s interest in the psychological security
afforded by having a parent who can make autonomous decisions
for him164 and in avoiding the disruptions that ongoing grandpar-
ent visitation orders cause.165  Continuing animosity between par-
ent and grandparent also raises the child’s interest in not being at
the center of intractable, ongoing family conflict.
A better analogy may be to the state’s ordering a child to be
placed in temporary foster care.  The state must take care not to
160. When the initial order is entered on consent of the parties, see e.g., In re Flo-
rence, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 2000, it seems particularly unfair to place an extra burden on
parents who later challenge the continuation of the order.
161. See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89 (1982).
162. N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 240 (McKinney 2003) (no prima facie right to custody in
either parent).
163. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. The liberty interest that favors parents also implies that
grandparents who lose a petition for visitation should have to show compelling new
facts in order to bring the petition again, to spare the family the renewed burdens of
these proceedings. See Gloria R. v. Alfred R., 631 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1995).
164. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
165. See text accompanying notes 32-61.
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unduly extend such interference in the family, unless that interven-
tion continues to be warranted.  The New York social services law
requires the state to do what it can to restore parents to their full
parental rights, and requires the court periodically to monitor the
necessity for continuing state care.166
Like foster care orders, grandparent visitation orders should
be considered temporary deprivations of parental child rearing
rights, and the state should similarly take care not to extend its in-
terference unnecessarily.  If a parent is burdened with the effort of
seeking review of the order after a reasonable time has passed living
under it, at least the state should not further burden the parent
with a required threshold showing before hearing the parent’s case
for ending or modifying the order.  Instead of having to prove
changed circumstances, the parent should only need to show the
requisites exist for restoration of her constitutional child rearing
rights.  That showing, as this paper suggests, should be that no ex-
traordinary and compelling circumstances exist which justify the
state in continuing to override parental child rearing choices.
ISSUE #5:  Should a Law Guardian for the child be routinely appointed
in grandparent visitation cases?
A reading of reported grandparent visitation decisions indi-
cates that law guardians are often appointed to represent chil-
dren.167  This practice can have significant negative effects on
children and parents, and it is imperative that the courts reconsider
the routine appointment of these lawyers.
Overlooked by both trial and appellate courts is the fact that
the law guardian appointment itself undermines the parent-child
relationship.  Children come to understand, early in the proceed-
ings, that their lawyer is not controlled by their parents, and that
the lawyer can take a position contrary to their parent’s position.
The children see that their parents are not trusted to protect them
in this situation.  The legal system’s distrust is communicated to the
166. N.Y. SOC. SERV. L. § 392 (McKinney 2003).
167. Discretionary power to appoint law guardians for children in these cases is
vested in the courts by FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (2003).  The lawyer may be appointed very
soon after the petition is filed, see e.g., Levy v. Levy, N.Y.L.J., Mar 22, 2001, at 28 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County).
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 78 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 78 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR305.txt unknown Seq: 44 16-APR-04 14:32
532 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
parents as well, despite the fact that no impropriety or malfeasance
has been shown to support such an attitude of distrust.
The children are asked to confide in this stranger, and to an-
swer personal questions about their life at home.  The law guardian
will want to interview the child out of the hearing of the parents, to
get answers not influenced by them.  Children are induced to speak
about their parents without having to respect their parental author-
ity, and in disregard of their family’s privacy.
This lawyer empowers children, who may have no understand-
ing of the reasons underlying their parents’ decision about the
grandparent, to ask for a new decision.  If children speak against
the parental decision, they aid in the effort to overthrow parental
authority, undermining that authority in the process.  Moreover, the ini-
tial rift between parent and grandparent can be extended to divide
parent from child.168
The law guardian’s appointment is a source of stress for the
parents, further invades their family privacy, and makes parenting
more difficult.  The parents’ own lawyer will indicate the impor-
tance of winning the support of the law guardian.  This lawyer is yet
another stranger — one who lacks the official position of the judge
or the training of the family evaluator — that must be provided
access to the family and to personal information about each of its
members.  The parents now have to convince not only the judge,
but the children’s lawyer, that their decision on visitation is in their
children’s best interests.  Parents may be offended by the lawyer’s
questioning of their parental decisions, or insulted by the lawyer’s
statements about them.169
This lawyer can represent the wishes of the child or advance
the child’s best interests as the lawyer perceives them, as well as
conduct his own investigation.170  Inevitably, the lawyer brings his
or her own subjective experiences and beliefs about grandparents
168. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN et al., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 112
(1979) (“The appointment of counsel for the child without regard to the wishes of the
parent is a drastic alteration of the parent-child relationship. . . . It intrudes upon the
integrity of the family and strains the psychological bonds that hold it together.”).
169. See examples given in Betty D. Friedlander, Law Guardian Bias: Do We Know It
When We See It?, 1 Ann. 2002 ATLA-CLE 495 (2002).
170. See Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
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and their proper role in children’s lives.  Without professional
training in psychology or human relations, there is no guarantee
that the lawyer will add anything to the case except his own subjec-
tive opinion and another attorney’s fee.171  It is not surprising that
law guardians have sometimes come up with their own best interests
recommendations that are idiosyncratic and occasionally downright
foolish.172  The case of Richard YY v. Sue ZZ173 illustrates the point.
A grandfather who had his grandson and two other boys in his
home had failed, on several occasions, to protect the grandchild
from sexual activity.  Despite his awareness of the problem, the
grandfather made only weak, ineffectual efforts to prevent repeat
incidents.  The mother, with unassailable good reason, saw the
grandfather as uncaring and irresponsible, and refused further visi-
tation.  The grandfather sued under D.R.L. § 72.  The court cor-
rectly denied his petition, and rejected the law guardian’s peculiar
recommendation that the grandfather have visitation, supervised in
the mother’s own home.
The appointment of law guardians in these cases can be distin-
guished from their more appropriate appointment in juvenile de-
linquency, child abuse, or child neglect proceedings.  In
delinquency cases, the child is the target of quasi-criminal proceed-
ings and needs a lawyer to avoid the serious consequences of loss of
liberty.  In abuse and neglect proceedings, the child’s health and
safety is at issue.  In both of these types of case, an authorized offi-
cial (police officer or caseworker) has made a threshold decision
that legal action is warranted.  In divorce cases where custody is at
issue, some courts suggest that a law guardian should be appointed
in some of these cases.  The law guardian’s presence is still intru-
sive, but the parents themselves have initiated the proceedings that
put the child’s custody into question and lead to the lawyer’s ap-
pointment.  Further, the law guardian’s recommendation will at
least support one of the parents.  Law guardians in grandparent vis-
171. See Principato v. Lombardi, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 2003 at 19 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County) (awarding guardian fees of $200 per hour).
172. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 168, at 18 (observing that it is a “fantasy” to assume
that lawyers, experts, and other participants in cases involving children’s issues are al-
ways the most skilled, the most sensitive and the most competent personnel.).
173. 673 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
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itation cases, by contrast, may side against both parents,174 in a pro-
ceeding not initiated by either one of them, and contribute to the
disturbances in parent-child relationships that these proceedings
induce.175
V. CONCLUSION
When litigation pits grandparents against ordinary, fit parents,
a host of burdens arises that plague the family unit and negatively
affect both parents and children.  These burdens extend beyond
the intrusions of coercive court visitation orders and lengthy court
supervision of those orders over the years of a subject child’s minor-
ity.  The litigation itself imposes heavy burdens on family privacy,
parental autonomy, and the parent-child relationship, even before
a final judgment ordering visitation is entered.
The Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville identified this issue as
one of constitutional dimension, but left it to the states, and to fu-
ture cases, to explore its true scope.  This article lays bare those
problems, and urges a deeper understanding on the part of New
York state judges of the damage that this litigation inflicts.  This
understanding, and the traditional respect New York accords family
privacy and parental autonomy in child rearing, should lead to an
interpretation of New York grandparent visitation law that firmly
controls this litigation.
The vague and elusive “best interest of the child” standard, em-
ployed in the New York visitation statute, does not provide a useful
way to resolve child rearing disputes that are not clear-cut.  Instead,
it provides shelter for judges who are inclined to substitute their
own subjective judgments and personal opinions for those of fit
parents.  To reform the legal regime in New York, I suggest these
changes:
174. See, e.g., Matter of Florence L, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 2000, at 30 (Fam. Ct. Nassau
County).
175. See supra, notes 33-61 and accompanying text. See also In re Marriage of Men-
try, 190 Cal.Rptr. 843, 849 (1983) (stating that one purpose behind the legal presump-
tion favoring parental autonomy “is to diminish the uncertainties and discontinuities
that can affect the parent-child relationship whenever third parties (lawyers as well as
judges) episodically intrude through an ill-equipped adversarial process in which deci-
sions are subject to reconsideration and eventual appellate review”).
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(1) New York’s threshold standing requirements should be
strengthened to provide protection for parents and children at the
outset of grandparent visitation litigation.
(2) The courts should adopt a ‘“strict scrutiny” standard to
evaluate the constitutionality of grandparent visitation orders im-
posed upon parents.
(3) The “best interests of the child” language in the New York
statute should be construed to require deference to parental
choices about visitation, except in extraordinary circumstances
where a child’s need for grandparent contact is compelling and is
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.
(4) To modify or terminate a grandparent visitation order, a
parent should not have to prove changed circumstances, but should
only need to show that no extraordinary and compelling circum-
stances exist which justify the state in continuing to override paren-
tal child rearing choices.
(5) Law guardians for children in grandparent visitation cases
impose additional burdens on families in these proceedings, and
they should not be routinely appointed.
The law’s role in family life is limited by cultural and constitu-
tional tradition.  Law should support ordinary parenting, and inter-
vene only when such intervention is truly essential to the welfare of
the child.  Children have a need for peace and harmony in their
lives, and a need for parental guidance.  They depend on their par-
ents for basic physical and emotional needs.  These needs cannot
be met under New York’s present grandparent visitation regime.
